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Abstract 
This study was conducted to explore organic and conventional dairy farmers’ 
perceptions of risk and risk management, and to examine relationships between 
farm and farmer characteristics, risk perceptions, and strategies. The data origi-
nate from a survey of conventional (n = 363) and organic (n = 162) dairy farmers 
in Norway. Organic farmers had the least risk averse perceptions. Institutional 
and production risks were perceived as primary sources of risk, with farm sup-
port payments at the top. Compared to their conventional colleagues, organic 
farmers gave more weight to institutional factors related to their production sys-
tems. Conventional farmers were more concerned about costs of purchased in-
puts and animal welfare policy. Organic and conventional farmers’ management 
responses were more similar than their risk perceptions. Financial measures such 
as liquidity and costs of production, disease prevention, and insurance were per-
ceived as important ways to handle risk. Even though perceptions were highly 
farmer-specific, a number of socio-economic variables were found to be related 
to risk and risk management. The primary role of institutional risks implies that 
policy makers should be cautious about changing policy capriciously and they 
should consider the scope for strategic policy initiatives that give farmers some 
greater confidence about the longer term. Further, researchers should pay more 
attention to institutional risks. 
1. Introduction 
Farmers’ perceptions of and responses to risk are important in understand-
ing  their  risk  behaviour.  In  the  literature  much  normative  analysis  (with 
mathematical programming etc.) has been done to show how farmers should 
behave under uncertainty (e.g. Hardaker et al., 2004). Surprisingly, however, less 
work has been done to examine how farmers perceive risk and manage it in 
practice. Organic farmers are exposed to additional and different sources of risk 
compared to conventional farmers. Restrictions on pesticide use, fertilisers, syn-
thetic medicines, purchase of feeds etc. influence production risk. Smaller or-
ganic markets may mean greater price fluctuations. On the other hand, specific 
direct payments in organic farming result in greater income stability (Offer-Ola Flaten et al.   430
mann and Nieberg, 2000, pp. 93). At the same time, and for both production 
types, uncertainty about future government payments may be of concern to 
farmers.
Surveys have been conducted asking about the types of risk perceived as 
most important by conventional farmers and about the management strategies 
the farmers use. Harwood et al. (1999) have summarised US studies. US farm-
ers, included dairy farmers, were most concerned about commodity price risk, 
production risk, and changes in government laws and regulations. Arizona dairy 
producers perceived the costs of operating inputs to be the greatest source of 
risk (Wilson et al., 1993). A 1996 USDA survey (reported in Harwood et al.,
1999) found that keeping cash on hand was the chief risk management strategy 
for every farm size, for every commodity speciality, and in every region studied. 
Use of derivative and insurance markets was also considered important. In a 
recent study (Hall et al., 2003), beef producers in Texas and Nebraska perceived 
severe droughts and cattle prices as the most important risk factors. Maintain-
ing animal health was viewed as the most effective strategy. 
Dairy farmers in New Zealand ranked price risk and rainfall variability high-
est, met by routine spraying, drenching and maintaining feed reserves (Martin, 
1996). Meuwissen et al. (2001) found that Dutch livestock farmers considered 
price and production risks to be most important. Producing at lowest possible 
costs and insurance were the most important risk management strategies. A 
study among Finnish farmers found changes in agricultural policy as the most 
important risk factor, while maintaining adequate liquidity and solidity were the 
most important management responses (Sonkkila, 2002). 
A few studies have found that geographic location, farm type, institutional 
structures and other factors affecting the operating environment of farmers in-
fluenced farmers’ perceptions of risk and risk management (Boggess et al., 1985; 
Wilson et al., 1993; Patrick and Musser, 1997; Meuwissen et al. 2001). The stud-
ies also pointed to “the highly complex and individualistic nature of risk per-
ceptions and selection of management tools” (Wilson et al., 1993). 
As far as we know, no earlier studies have compared conventional and or-
ganic farmers’ risk perceptions and risk management strategies. In Norway, no 
studies at all have explicitly investigated dairy farmers’ risk perceptions and the 
ways they deal with the risks. 
This relative lack of information about (especially organic) farmers’ risky 
environment and their reactions to it means that there are few useful practical 
insights for policy makers, farm advisers and researchers. The objectives of this 
study are, through an exploratory and descriptive study, to provide empirical 
insight into: 1) Norwegian dairy farmers’ risk perceptions and risk management 
responses; 2) differences in risk perceptions and management responses be-
tween conventional and organic dairy farmers; and 3) farm and farmer charac-
teristics related to the perceptions and strategies. The data are analysed with 
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2. Conceptual framework 
Economists have traditionally used one theory of risky choice to serve both 
normative and descriptive purposes (Thaler, 2000). Expected utility theory is 
the most widely accepted normative model of rational choice (Meyer, 2000) 
that economists have used also as a descriptive model of decision making under 
risk (Thaler, 2000). Numerous studies have, however, criticised the expected 
utility hypothesis on descriptive grounds because it fails to describe observed 
behaviour  (Kahneman  and  Tversky,  1979;  Allais,  1984;  Moschini  and 
Hennessy, 2001, Rabin and Thaler, 2001). The best way to describe decision-
making behaviour, according to Slovic et al. (1982), March and Shapira (1987) 
and Priem et al. (2002), is to understand the individual’s frame of reference for 
evaluating choices with uncertain outcomes because the decision maker’s per-
ceptual world is that person’s reality and forms the basis for her or his choices. 
This paper will use a descriptive approach, where we aim to characterise 
how Norwegian dairy farmers perceive and manage risk. Because of organic 
farmers’ exposure to additional and different sources of risk compared to con-
ventional farmers, we expect these to influence their risk perceptions and man-
agement responses. For example, organic farmers purchase less of variable in-
puts, and we thus expect organic farmers to be less susceptible financially to 
input price shocks. The lack of earlier comparative studies, however, makes it 
hard to develop firm hypotheses. Instead, we will explore and identify differ-
ences between organic and conventional farmers in their assessed importance 
of various sources of risk and their management responses of these risks. 
We do not expect either group of farmers to be a homogeneous population 
since we expect different farm and farmer characteristics to influence their risk 
perceptions and management responses. Van Raaij’s (1981) model of the deci-
sion-making environment for the firm is useful to study the relationship be-
tween farm and personal characteristics, risk perceptions and management re-
sponses (e.g., Wilson et al., 1993). Figure 1 presents the groups of variables used 
in our research design. The other elements of Van Raaij’s model are excluded. 
First, PoE/P describes how farm and personal variables (P) impact on 
farmers’  perceptions  of  risk  factors  (E/P).  Second,  the  relationship 
PoE/PoB reflects how the farm/personal variables and risk perceptions in-
fluence economic behaviour (B), i.e., their risk management strategies. Best use 
of intuition and prior insights from research in other countries were used in the 
selection of variables. 
3. Materials and methods 
3.1. Data 
The data reported here were collected as a part of a larger questionnaire sur-
vey of risk and risk management in farming. Samples were selected from Nor-Ola Flaten et al.   432
wegian crop and dairy farmers. This paper examines data from dairy farmers; an 
analysis of the data from crop farmers is reported in Koesling et al. (2004). Be-
cause of small herd sizes in Norway, dairy farms were defined as farms having 
more than five dairy cows. 
The 10-page questionnaire consisted of questions related to: 1) farmers’ per-
ceptions of risk (including questions on risk attitude and sources of risk); 2) 
farmers’ perceptions of various risk management strategies; 3) farmers’ goals, 
future  plans  and  motivations  for  their  farming  system  (organic  or  conven-
tional); 4) animal disease management strategies; and 5) characteristics of the 
farm and farmer. Most questions were of the closed type, many in the form of 
seven point Likert-type scales. The questionnaire was both pre-tested internally 
and  in  sessions  with  farmers,  and  refined  over  several  stages  based  on  the 
comments and suggestions received. 
The Norwegian Agricultural Authority (SLF) has a register of farmers who 
receive support payments (i.e. all farmers), including each farmer’s stocking and 
cropping details. Dairy cow health and production records are registered in the 
Norwegian Herd Recording System, in which 96.5% of the dairy farmers par-
ticipate (Østerås, 2003). These two data sets (2002-data) were merged with the 
survey data. 
3.2. Sample 
The questionnaire was first sent out in January 2003 to 616 randomly se-
lected conventional dairy farmers and all 245 registered organic dairy farmers. 
Conventional farmers were selected from the SLF-register of farmers who re-
ceived support payments based on their 2001 application. A month later a re-
minder post card was sent to all non-respondents. In March, non-respondents 
were mailed with a follow-up letter and another copy of the questionnaire. 
From the original 861 dairy farmers approached (in 2001), 383 (62.2%) con-
ventional  and  161  (65.7%)  organic  farmers  responded.  Six  conventional  re-
spondents informed us that they had quit farming. Seven conventional and two 
organic farmers had quit dairying. Five dairy respondents had converted to or-
ganic farming methods and one from organic to conventional farming. Two 
originally non-dairy respondents had started organic dairy farming. Three con-
ventional and three organic responses were discarded because of very incom-
plete returns. The questionnaires of 363 conventional and 162 organic farmers 
Figure 1.  Elements of Van Raaij’s (1981) model of a firm’s decision-making envi-
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(in 2002/2003) were then available for statistical analysis. Because of the sam-
pling strategy used and the high response rate, the samples are assumed to be 
representative of the conventional and organic dairy farmer populations. 
3.3. Statistical analyses 
All computations were conducted using the SAS statistical program package 
(v 8.2). As a first step, farmers’ perceptions of risk and risk management were 
studied using descriptive statistical analyses. Mean values obtained in organic 
and conventional farming for a variable were compared by t-tests, omitting an 
observation if it had a missing value. Standard parametric statistical procedures 
were assumed appropriate for ordinal variables in the form of Likert-type scales 
(e.g. Patrick and Musser, 1997; Meuwissen et al., 2001). 
Common factor analysis, from an exploratory perspective, was employed to 
summarise the information in a reduced number of factors. The latent root cri-
terion (eigenvalue ! 1) was first used as a guideline in determining how many 
factors to extract. In order to have the most representative and parsimonious 
set of factors possible, factor solutions with different numbers of factors were 
also examined before structures were defined (Hair et al., 1998). Orthogonal 
(varimax) rotation was used, to ensure inter alia that the factors were as inde-
pendent  as  possible  for  subsequent  use  in  regressions.  Standardised  factor 
scores for each farmer and factor were saved for subsequent multivariate analy-
ses.
Some 40 % of the respondents did not answer one or more relevant ques-
tions about sources of risk or management responses (Table 1). In cases with 
missing data, most of the respondents failed to answer only a few items. If 
remedies for missing data are not applied, any observations with missing values 
on any of the items are omitted. Using only complete observations can produce 
bias in the results unless the missing observations are missing completely at 
random. There is also a loss of precision as the sample size is reduced (Hair et
al., 1998). Our approach for dealing with missing data in these factor analyses 
was first to delete cases having answered less than 20 of the risk source vari-
Table 1:  Number of unanswered questions on sources of riska (n = 31) across risk 
management strategies (n = 25) within categories of groups 
    Sources of risk 
Groups  0 1-5  6-11 12-20 >20 Total
0  315 78  2 1 3 399
1-5  65 33  2 0 1 101
6-13  6 4  0 0 0 10
>13  7 1  2 0 5 15
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Total  393 116  6 1 9 525 
a A total of 33 variables were presented, but two crop farm specific sources of risk are excludedOla Flaten et al.   434
ables  or  12  of  the  risk  management  strategies  variables.  Next,  missing  data 
points were replaced with the mean value of that variable based on all valid re-
sponses in the group (conventional or organic). 
Organic and conventional farmers may have different risk perceptions but 
some preliminary analyses revealed very similar factor structures among risk 
sources and management responses. Therefore joint factor analyses for the two 
groups of farmers were carried out. 
The factor scores from the risk attitude questions were submitted to a non-
hierarchical cluster analysis to search for groupings of farmers with similar risk 
attitudes. The sequential threshold method combined with the least square op-
timisation criterion was used to select cluster seeds (Hair et al., 1998). Creating 
the risk attitude variable by use of cluster analysis, rather than identifying the 
risk groups by using e.g. median split, reduces the chance of arbitrariness when 
identifying groups. 
Multiple (ordinary least square and logistic) regressions were used to study 
associations between farm and farmer characteristics, risk perceptions and risk 
management, as outlined in figure 1. An observation was excluded from the 
analysis, if any variable needed for a regression was missing, for example a cate-
gorical farm or farmer characteristic. Simple correlation coefficients between all 
pairs of independent variables were low. Variance inflation factors were close to 
1 and condition indices were low, indicating no multicollinearity problems (Bel-
sley et  al.,  1980).  No  heteroskedasticity  was  detected  using  the  White  test 
(White, 1980). The stepwise regression method was tested. Compared to the 
complete models, signs of the coefficients were identical, magnitudes of the co-
efficients were quite similar, and the levels of statistical significance of the inde-
pendent variables were almost stable. The complete regression models were se-
lected for reporting herein. 
4. Results and discussion 
4.1. General characteristics of respondents 
The main characteristics of the dairy farm groups are compared in Table 2. 
The average farm size of conventional respondents was slightly larger than the 
average  in  Norway.  Respondents  were  somewhat  younger  than  the  average 
dairy farmer. 
Organic respondents farmed more land on average than conventional re-
spondents. Average numbers of dairy cows were quite similar between the 
two groups, but organic cows were fed less concentrate and produced less 
milk. Labour input and farmers’ age were quite similar on conventional and 
organic farms. Organic farmers had most years of schooling and more of 
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farms: 93% of conventional and 88% of organic farms. Partnerships occurred 
on 6% of the farms. 
4.2. Farmer’s willingness to take risk 
Farmers were asked to assess their willingness to take risk, compared to oth-
ers, on Likert-type scales ranging from 1 (do not agree) to 7 (fully agree). The 
statements were “I am willing to take more risk than other with respect to: 1) 
production; 2) marketing; and 3) finance and investment”, respectively. Patrick 
and Musser (1997) and Meuwissen et al. (2001) used similar statements.119 We 
assumed that most farmers are risk averse, but they vary in their willingness to 
take risk (Hardaker et al., 2004, pp. 92). Since statements measured attitude to-
ward risks compared to others, the term comparative risk aversion (CRA) was 
used. Figure 2 compares the percentage distribution of organic and conven-
tional respondents’ answers in relationship to the statements. 
119 The measures used to elicit farmers’ risk preferences in all these studies, including ours, is 
a simple approximation. More advanced methods to elicit farmers’ risk attitude is discussed in, 
e.g., Moschini and Hennessy (2001) and Hardaker et al. (2004). 
Table 2 :  Comparison of average characteristics of dairy farms in survey with aver-
ages of dairy farms in Norwaya
Conventional  Organic  Characteristics
Survey
(n = 363) 
Norway
(18,300)b
Survey
(n = 162) 
Norway 
(325)b
Number of dairy cowsb
Milk yield per cowc (kg)
Concentratesc (FUmd/cow)
Farmland (ha)b
Labour units (man-years) 
Age of farmerb
Highest level of educatione (%) 
Agricultural education (%) 
Farm incomef (%) 
Household incomeg (%) 
16.9
6193
1649
25.8
2.1
47.5
17 / 70 / 10 / 3 
59.7
54.8
42.2
15.8
6150
1706
23.3
-
51.6
-
-
-
-
16.8
5119
887
30.3
2.1
47.2
6 / 54 / 22 / 18 
76.1
46.8
50.3
16.8
5070
866
30.2
-
52.1
-
-
-
-
a Information was also gathered on net worth and debt. Many refusals to answer precluded their use in the 
statistical analyses. 
b Data (2002) from the Norwegian Agricultural Authority. 
c Data (2002) from the Norwegian Herd Recording System. 
d One feed unit milk (FUm) is defined as 6900 kJ of net energy lactation (Ekern, 1991). 
e Primary school / high school / BSc / MSc. 
f Percentage of respondents (spouse included) with farm income t NOK (Norwegian kroner) 200 000. € 1 |
NOK 8.40. 
g Percentage of respondents (spouse included) with household income t NOK 350 000. Household income 
covers farm income, other forms of self-employment, wages, pensions, property income and capital income.Ola Flaten et al.   436
Conventional dairy farmers generally perceived the extent to which they take 
risks to be less than that of others. By contrast, figure 2 shows that the re-
sponses of the organic dairy farmers had a more symmetric distribution over 
the scale of comparative risk aversion, especially with respect to production 
risks. Organic farmers’ assessments were significantly less risk averse than their 
conventional colleagues (both production and marketing P  0.001, finance and 
investment P  0.01).  Organic  farmers  have  been  few  in  numbers  and  the 
amount  of experience with this form  of production is somewhat restricted. 
Some willingness to take risk should therefore be expected among those adopt-
ing organic farming practices. Using historical data,  Gardebroek (2002) also 
found organic farmers to be less risk averse than their non-organic colleagues. 
Figure 2.   Percentage distribution of organic and conventional respondents’ compara-
tive risk aversion 
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The  three  risk  attitude  questions  all  had  significant  positive  correlations 
(P  0.001) ranging from 0.57 to 0.62. Kaiser’s overall measure of sampling 
adequacy (MSA) was 0.717, suggesting that the matrix was suitable for factor 
analysis (Hair et al., 1998). Factor analysis of the variables resulted in a single 
factor  with  all  three  variables  loading  at  0.76  or  higher  and  accounting  for 
73.7% of the total variance. The three risk attitude measures were summarised 
in a single variable (factor score). 
Table 3:  Mean score for conventional and organic farmers, and joint varimax rotated 
factor loadings for sources of risk (by declining importance for conventional farmers) 
Sources of risk  Conv. Org. Org. Most important factorsa
  meanb mean rank 1  2  3  4  5  6 
Changes in gov. support payments   **5.90 5.56 (1) 0.02 0.43 0.00 0.21 0.20 0.19
Changes in tax policy  ***5.86 4.99 (6) 0.15 0.50 -0.13 0.20 0.22 0.24
Milk price variability  ***5.81 5.28 (2) 0.26 0.45 -0.08 0.19 0.47 0.01
Milk quota policy   ***5.56 4.83 (9) 0.22 0.50 0.02 0.06 0.31 0.02
Meat price variability  ***5.55 4.72 (10) 0.26 0.43 -0.08 0.20 0.37 0.06
Animal welfare policy   ***5.40 4.17 (17) 0.22 0.69 -0.03 -0.10 -0.12 0.07
Costs of operating inputs  ***5.23 3.98 (21) 0.27 0.40 -0.17 0.36 0.28 0.09
Injury, illness, death of operator(s)  5.18 5.05 (5) 0.15 0.16 0.09 0.07 0.17 0.75
Changes in consumer preferences  5.17 5.10 (4) 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.58 0.15
Non-domestic epidemic animal dis.  **5.10 4.53 (13) 0.53 0.19 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.27
Domestic epidemic animal diseases   ***4.96 4.16 (18) 0.74 0.19 -0.02 0.08 -0.01 0.24
Forage yields uncertainty  4.86 4.84 (8) 0.53 0.02 0.09 0.17 0.32 0.06
Other gov. laws and regulations  *4.78 4.40 (14) 0.13 0.52 0.19 0.20 -0.02 0.17
Cost of capital equipment  ***4.74 3.87 (25) 0.30 0.37 -0.09 0.33 0.21 0.10
Fire damages  ***4.59 3.86 (26) 0.44 0.19 -0.01 0.19 0.03 0.40
Cost of credit (interest rate)  **4.51 3.97 (22) 0.22 0.08 0.02 0.73 0.08 0.07
Crop prices variability  4.47 4.25 (16) d.  d.  d.  d.  d.  d. 
Technical failure  ***4.46 3.90 (24) 0.42 0.23 0.02 0.28 0.13 0.20
Meat production variability  ***4.43 3.71 (27) 0.57 0.25 0.05 0.20 0.25 0.09
Family members’ health situation  4.40 4.11 (19) 0.24 0.16 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.56
Marketing/sale   *4.35 4.65 (11) 0.09 0.01 0.18 0.01 0.54 0.08
Changes in technology  ***4.35 3.68 (28) d.  d.  d.  d.  d.  d. 
Crop yields variability  4.33 4.37 (15) d.  d.  d.  d.  d.  d. 
Legislation in production hygiene  4.28 3.93 (23) 0.24 0.62 0.18 -0.06 -0.08 0.09
Production diseases   *4.23 3.61 (29) 0.67 0.20 0.03 0.11 0.14 0.06
Milk yield variability  *4.17 3.53 (30) 0.52 0.25 0.04 0.19 0.21 -0.03
Hired labour  3.86 4.06 (20) d.  d.  d.  d.  d.  d. 
Credit availability   3.57 3.28 (33) 0.22 0.09 0.16 0.65 0.02 0.11
Uncertainty about family relations   3.31 3.30 (32) d.  d.  d.  d.  d.  d. 
Leasing farm land  3.31 3.40 (31) d.  d.  d.  d.  d.  d. 
Add. organic farming payments  ***2.67 5.24 (3) 0.07 0.05 0.84 0.02 0.05 0.05
Organic farming laws/regulations   ***2.27 4.63 (12) 0.02 0.08 0.88 0.02 0.06 0.08
Price premiums organic products   ***2.24 4.91 (7) 0.02 -0.07 0.88 0.08 0.09 0.00
Percent of total variance explained  - - - 11.9 10.7 9.2 6.2 6.0 5.3
Cum. % of the variance explained   - - - 11.9 22.6 31.8 38.0 44.0 49.2
a Factors 1 to 6 are production, institutional, organic farming, credit, consumer demand, and human resources, 
respectively. Factor loadings >|0.30| are in bold. “d.” means that the variable is deleted from the factor analysis 
because of low factor loading and low communality or farm-type conditionality. 
b Mean score (1 = no impact, 7 = very high impact) for conventional farmers (n = 363) and organic farmers (n = 
162). Mean numbers marked with asterisks show that the mean scores of conventional and organic farmers are 
significant different at * P  0.05, ** P  0.01 and *** P  0.001, based on independent samples t-test.Ola Flaten et al.   438
The single factor scores from the factor analysis were used as input data in 
the cluster analysis; by this means it was possible to identify three distinct risk 
aversion clusters among the respondents. The cluster groups consisted of 210 
farmers with “high risk aversion”, 201 with “medium risk aversion” and 110 
with “low risk aversion”. Four respondents were excluded because of missing 
data. The three ordered categories of risk aversion were used in subsequent re-
gressions.
4.3. Perceptions of sources of risk 
In total, 33 sources of risk were presented to the respondents. Farmers were 
asked to score each source of risk on a Likert-scale from 1 (no impact) to 7 
(very high impact) to express how significant they considered each source of 
risk to be in terms of its potential impact on the economic performance of their 
farm. The second and third columns of Table 3 compare average scores for 
conventional and organic farmers.120 The fourth column shows organic farm-
ers’ ranking. 
Uncertainty  about  the  continuation  of  general  government  support  pay-
ments stands out as the top-rated source of risk for both groups. Target prices 
and support schemes are decided in Norway through annual negotiations be-
tween the two farmers’ unions and the Government. High average rankings re-
lated  to  milk  and  meat  prices  are  thus  linked  to  farm  policy.  Other  highly 
ranked risks in general were institutional risks such as tax policy and milk quota 
policy.
Sources of risk that scored low include farmland leasing, family relations, 
credit availability, milk yield, production diseases, and hired labour. 
Conventional farmers assigned more importance than organic farmers to 
many of the listed sources of risk. The less risk averse perceptions of organic 
farmers may have influenced the mean scores. The most pronounced differ-
ences were found in costs of operating inputs, animal welfare policy, and cost 
of capital equipment. The finding that organic farmers ranked input costs risk 
lower than conventional farmers is probably a result of production systems in 
organic farming with low levels of purchased inputs. At the time the survey was 
held a white paper on animal welfare was prepared (LD, 2002), maybe influenc-
ing the high score conventional farmers gave to animal welfare policy risks. 
Less pronounced anxiety among organic farmers for this source of risk is pre-
sumably  because of already strict organic animal  welfare standards. Organic 
farmers gave high scores to the specific, institutional “organic sources of risk” 
(the last three sources in Table 3). Beyond these, marketing/sales was the only 
source of risk where organic farmers’ mean score was significantly higher than 
120 The standard deviations are not presented in Tables 3 and 4 because of the large size of 
the tables. The results are available from the authors. Comparing Risk Perceptions and Risk Management in Dairy Farming  439
that for conventional farmers, maybe reflecting the higher instability in organic 
product markets. 
Comparisons of risks (and management strategies) with previous studies are 
difficult because different questions were asked. Further, different farming, cul-
tural and risk environments complicate cross-national comparisons. However, 
the most outstanding finding, compared to previous US, NZ, and Dutch stud-
ies, is the very high scores of many institutional risks. Agricultural policy chan-
ges, however, scored high in Finland (Sonkkila, 2002). 
Since farming is typically a risky business, governments around the world 
have intervened to varying degrees to try to help farmers cope more effectively 
with risk. In this context it is a paradox that farmers perceived institutional risks 
as the most important. The domination of institutional risks may be related to 
somewhat unpredictable changes in Norwegian farm policies and regulations, 
together with external pressures for deregulation and associated fears of farm 
support cuts. The finding should also be linked to Just’s (2003) proposal that 
longer term swings (e.g. lasting changes in agricultural policy) represent a much 
greater  risk  to  farmers  than  year-to-year  variability  in  payoffs  because  the 
downside consequences may be sufficiently prolonged to cause farm failure. 
Joint factor analysis was applied to the data to reduce the number of risk 
source variables. The overall MSA was 0.850, suggesting the matrix was suitable 
for factor analysis. The number of variables was reduced from 33 to 6. Some 
49.2% of the total variance was accounted for. The latent root criterion sug-
gested seven factors. The six-factor solution gave the most interpretable factors 
and was judged to be most useful. Variables conditional on farm type (crop 
yields and prices) were not included. Variables that did not load significantly on 
any factor (i.e. loadings _0.30_) or whose communalities were low (0.25) were 
also evaluated for possible deletion. Table 3 displays the six factors and their 
respective loading items after elimination of some variables. 
The factors 1 to 6 are labelled “production”, “institutional”, “organic farm-
ing”, “credit”, “consumer demand”, and “human resources” respectively. Fac-
tor 1, production, loads significantly from a variety of production variables and 
has the highest loadings of animal disease variables. A wide collection of public 
payment and government legislation variables indicates institutional risks in fac-
tor 2. Significant loadings of output and input prices could reflect the govern-
ment’s role in the pricing. Factor 3 is called organic farming because of the ex-
tremely  high  loadings  of  the  three  specific,  institutional  “organic”  variables. 
Factor 4, credit, has large loadings of the interest rate and credit availability. 
Significant loadings of purchased inputs are likely to reflect the use of credit to 
these purposes in a farm business. Factor 5, consumer demand, involves high 
loadings of consumer preferences and marketing. Not surprisingly, some out-
put price cross loadings are also significant. Heavy loadings of health and family 
variables and a cross loading of 0.40 of fire damage suggests human resources 
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4.4. Perceptions of risk management strategies 
Some 25 risk management strategies were presented for the farmers’ considera-
tion. Farmers indicated their perceived importance of each strategy on a Likert-
scale from 1 (not relevant) to 7 (very relevant). Results are reported in Table 4. 
Strategies generally perceived as very relevant were good liquidity, prevent and 
reduce livestock diseases, buy farm business insurance and personal insurance 
and produce at lowest possible cost. In recent studies of livestock farmers in 
other countries the same strategies were also perceived as most important (Meu-
wissen et al., 2001; Hall et al., 2003), even though national risk environments are 
quite different. 
Table 4   Mean score for conventional and organic farmers, and joint varimax rotated 
factor loadings for risk management strategies. Ranked by declining impor-
tance for conventional farmers 
Risk management  
strategies 
Conv. Org. Org.  Most important factorsa
  meanb mean rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Liquidity – keep cash in hand   **6.50 6.19 (1) 0.08 0.20 0.07 0.20 -0.06 0.50 0.02 
Prev./red. livestock diseases  *6.35 6.13 (2) 0.06 0.64 0.03 0.27 -0.09 0.22 0.10 
Buying farminsurance  *6.13 5.80 (3) 0.19 0.22 0.05 0.63 -0.04 0.11 -0.04 
Producing allower cost  **5.94 5.61 (5) 0.09 0.29 0.03 0.09 -0.02 0.33 0.18 
Buying personal insurance  **5.92 5.50 (6) 0.16 0.12 0.07 0.83 0.12 0.08 0.16 
Risk reducing technologies   5.73 5.67 (4) 0.23 0.46 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.10 0.18 
Solvency – debt management  ***5.65 5.16 (9) -0.05 0.02 0.06 -0.02 0.13 0.78 -0.05 
Prevent/reduce dis. and pests  5.52 5.39 (7) 0.07 0.71 0.24 0.05 0.12 0.04 0.05 
Use of agron. Nutr. cons. Serv.  *5.44 5.06 (10) 0.66 0.13 -0.03 0.12 -0.01 0.00 0.10 
Small gradual changes   5.38 5.18 (8) d.  d.  d.  d.  d.  d.  d. 
Cooperative marketing   ***5.35 4.78 (12) d.  d.  d.  d.  d.  d.  d. 
Use of veter cons./serv.  ***5.09 4.31 (16) 0.65 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.03 
Asset  flexibility   4.88 4.94 (11) 0.01 0.06 0.47 0.03 0.23 0.13 0.19 
Shared eqmt.  part.ship  4.87 4.64 (14) 0.13 0.14 -0.08 0.03 0.18 -0.01 0.66 
Keeping fixed  costs low   4.61 4.69 (13) 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.39 
Use of econ.  consult. services  4.44 4.14 (19) 0.66 0.00 0.11 0.14 0.20 -0.03 0.15 
Enterprise diversification  4.28 4.41 (15) 0.04 0.11 0.21 -0.09 0.33 0.00 0.18 
Storage  4.16 4.08 (20) 0.05 0.12 0.58 0.07 -0.11 0.08 -0.15 
Prod. contracts  4.07 4.03 (21) 0.17 0.15 0.42 0.07 0.07 0.03 -0.04 
Off-farm work  4.02 4.01 (22) 0.09 0.03 -0.02 0.05 0.41 0.10 0.10 
Information *3.79 4.22 (18) 0.19 0.14 0.24 -0.01 0.34 -0.06 0.17 
Prod. and market  flexibility   ***3.40 4.24 (17) -0.12 -0.02 0.63 -0.05 0.14 -0.05 0.39 
Surplus mach.ry capacity  *3.39 3.05 (23) d.  d.  d.  d.  d.  d.  d. 
Off-farm investments  2.68 2.60 (24) 0.01 -0.10 0.05 0.04 0.70 -0.04 -0.05 
Organise the farm as a corp.  2.39 2.20 (25) d.  d.  d.  d.  d.  d.  d. 
% of total var.  explained  - - - 7.3 7.0 6.5 6.2 5.3 5.2 4.8 
Cum. % of the var. explained   - - - 7.3 14.3 20.7 26.9 32.2 37.4 42.2 
a Factors 1 to 7 are consultancy, disease prevention, flexibility, insurance, diversification, financial and fixed 
cost sharing. Factor loadings >_0.30_ are in bold. “d.” means that the variable is deleted from the factor analy-
sis because of low factor loading and low communality. 
b Mean score (1 = not important, 7 = very important) for conventional farmers (n = 363) and organic farmers 
(n = 162). Mean numbers marked with asterisks show that the mean scores of conventional and organic 
farmers are significant different at *P0.05, **P0.01 and ***P0.001, based on independent samples t-test.Comparing Risk Perceptions and Risk Management in Dairy Farming  441
Farmers generally did not see corporate farm organisation, off-farm invest-
ments, surplus machinery capacity, collecting information, off-farm work and use 
of price contracts as important strategies. The low ranking of collecting informa-
tion could be a negative response to the need to collect still more information (in-
ter alia related to quality assurance schemes) than to the importance of collecting 
information per se. Time-intensive dairy farming does not lend itself to off-farm 
work strategies, but 43% of the respondents perceived off-farm work as an im-
portant strategy (a score of 5 or higher). The low mean score assigned to price 
contracts may be because of the extensive use of cooperative marketing among 
Norwegian farmers and the Norwegian agricultural policy system, but livestock 
farmers in more deregulated countries have also ranked derivative instruments 
low (Martin, 1996; Meuwissen et al., 2001; Hall et al., 2003). 
Organic and conventional farmers perceptions of the importance of differ-
ent  management  responses  were  much  more  similar  than  their  perceptions 
about the sources of risk. Conventional farmers attached particularly greater 
importance than organic farmers to veterinary services, cooperative marketing 
and solvency (debt management). The differences may be attributable to differ-
ences between the two production systems and the high importance of “non-
economic” goals among organic farmers. Organic farmers assigned significantly 
higher scores only to product and market flexibility and collecting information, 
but neither of these belonged to the risk strategies assigned high importance. 
The overall MSA for the risk management variables was 0.736, suggesting 
the matrix was suitable for factor analysis. The joint factor analysis identified 
seven factors with eigenvalues greater than one accounting for 42.2% of the 
variance. This solution gave interpretable and feasible factors and was used in 
the further analysis. Candidates for deletion were assessed in the same way as 
for the sources of risk. Table 4 displays the seven factors and their respective 
loading items after deletion of some variables. 
The factors 1 to 7 are interpreted as “consultancy”, “disease prevention”, 
“flexibility”, “insurance”, “diversification”, “financial” and “fixed cost sharing” 
respectively. Factor 1, consultancy, has high loadings of the consultancy ser-
vices  (veterinarian,  agronomy/nutrition,  and  economics).  Factor  2  is  named 
disease  prevention  because  of  large  loadings  of  prevention/reduction  of 
crop/forage and livestock diseases and pests. A significant loading of risk re-
ducing technologies accompanies the disease prevention strategies. Factor 3, 
flexibility, includes on-farm strategies to enhance flexibility (storage included) 
and price contracts. Factor 4 has heavy loadings of insurance contracts, and is 
accordingly labelled insurance. Off-farm (investments and work) and on-farm 
strategies to spread risk are included in factor 5, diversification. A significant 
loading of collecting information is also included. Factor 6 includes financial 
aspects of the farm business (solvency, liquidity, and production costs). Con-
trolling fixed costs through shared ownership of equipment and partnership 
loads high on factor 7, fixed cost sharing. Moreover, another fixed cost strat-Ola Flaten et al.   442
egy, keeping fixed costs low (e.g. through hiring land and machinery), and a 
cross loading of product and market flexibility load significantly. 
4.5. Risk aversion and sources of risk in relation to farm and farmer characteristics 
A multi-response ordered logit model was used to examine the relationship 
between  comparative  risk  aversion  and  socio-economic  variables.  For  the 
sources of risk ordinary least square (OLS) multiple regressions were used. Re-
gression coefficients and goodness-of-fit measures are presented in Table 5. 
All models summarised in Table 5, except that for “human resources”, were 
significant.  Usually,  goodness-of-fit  is  fairly  low  for  discrete  choice  models 
Table: 5  Results of multiple regressions for comparative risk aversion (CRA) and 
sources of risk against socio-economic variablesa, n = 457 
Sources of risk  Independent  
variables
CRAb
Production Institutional Organic
farming
Credit  Consumer 
demand 
Human
resources 
Farming systemc ***0.96 ***-0.35 ***-0.52 ***1.40 *-0.23 0.02 -0.01
CRA: ma-md n.i. 0.01 0.09 -0.05 -0.09 **0.28 (*)0.16
CRA: la-md n.i. 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.10 **0.31 -0.04
Ownershipe -0.06 0.12 -0.24 -0.16 0.03 0.00 0.19
Nr. of cows  *0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 (*)0.01 0.01 0.00
Farm exp.ce (yrs)  -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Educationf -0.07 -0.01 0.10 0.02 0.07 -0.03 0.02
Ag. educationg 0.13 -0.08 -0.09 (*)-0.14 0.07 0.13 0.00
Off-farm workh  (*)0.39 0.00 0.02 -0.13 0.03 (*)0.14 0.06
Off-farm invest.i -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.08 ***-0.29 -0.12 0.05
SGM dairy (%)j 0.34 -0.10 0.40 -0.19 -0.02 -0.31 -0.34
Farm incomek *-0.49 -0.04 0.04 0.01 0.05 -0.03 -0.04
H.hold incomel 0.34 -0.14 -0.13 -0.12 -0.11 -0.05 -0.02
Geographym 0.30 *0.23 0.10 -0.02 -0.11 0.03 -0.10
R2adjn   ***0.121 ***0.029 ***0.081 ***0.433 **0.037 *0.023 0.000
a Variables and models significant at  (*)P0.10, *P0.05, **P0.01 and ***P0.001. “n.i.” stands for “not in-
cluded”. 
b Measured as an ordered response variable where 1 denotes the most risk averse attitude, 2 the medium and 3 the 
least. 
c Measured as a dummy variable where 1 denotes organic farming and 0 denotes conventional farming. 
d Measured as two dummy variables “ma-m” and “la-m” where 0 denotes the medium risk averse attitude (m), and 
1 denotes the most risk averse attitude (ma) and the least risk averse attitude (la), respectively. 
e Measured as a dummy variable where 1 denotes partnerships and 0 denotes otherwise. 
f Measured as a dummy variable where 1 denotes formal schooling beyond high school and 0 denotes high school 
education or less. 
g Measured as a dummy variable where 1 denotes agricultural education and 0 denotes otherwise. 
h Measured as a dummy variable where 1 denotes off-farm work (farmer and/or spouse) and 0 denotes no off-
farm work. 
i Measured as a dummy variable where 1 denotes off-farm investments the last five years and 0 denotes otherwise. 
j Measured as percent of the farm’s total standard gross margin (SGM) from the dairy enterprise. 
k Measured as a dummy variable where 1 denotes farm income t NOK 200 000 and 0 denotes otherwise. 
lMeasured as a dummy variable where 1 denotes household income t NOK 350 000 and 0 denotes otherwise.
m Measured as a dummy variable where 1 denotes central location (no regional policy priority) and 0 denotes oth-
erwise, cf. KRD (2003). 
n The Nagelkerke approach was used to determine the coefficient of determination (Pseudo-R2) in the ordered 
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(Verbeek, 2000, pp. 186). The specified logit model performed 12% better than 
a model that specified the probability of take up to be constant.  
The goodness-of-fit coefficients in the significant OLS models were low, 
except  “organic  farming”,  suggesting  very  personal  perceptions  and/or  that 
important variables explaining farmers’ perceptions have been excluded. Exclu-
sion of many socio-economic variables of potential importance was judged not 
to be very likely.
The extremely low debt/asset ratios and high liquidity measures often found 
in  farming  are,  however,  consistent  with  risk  aversion  (Musser  and  Patrick, 
2002), as shown for a solvency measure in Meuwissen et al. (2001). These issues 
could not be examined in our study. Farmer-specificity of perceptions is in line 
with  previous  studies  (Boggess  et  al.,  1985;  Wilson  et  al.,  1993;  Patrick  and 
Musser, 1997; Meuwissen et al., 2001). 
Organic  farmers  had  very  significantly  less  comparative  risk  aversions 
(CRA) than conventional farmers, which is in agreement with the results pre-
sented in Fig. 2. Farmers having more dairy cows had a lower degree of CRA. 
Increased farm income implied, unexpectedly, higher degree of CRA. The last 
relationship  may  be  of  less  economic  importance,  since  it  is  the  risk  that 
threaten a farmer’s long-term asset base that really matter (Just, 2003). 
“Organic farming” was the only risk source organic farmers, compared to 
conventional farmers, perceived as significantly more important (column three 
to eight). In relation to organic farmers, conventional farmers perceived pro-
duction, institutional and credit sources of risk as significantly more important, 
maybe related to their higher use of variable inputs. 
Consumer demand was the only risk source factor that was significantly in-
fluenced by farmers’ CRA. Both the most and least risk averse farmers found 
consumer demand risks more important than the medium risk averse farmers. 
Of the other socio-economic characteristics, only off-farm investments and 
location had significant effects on the perceptions of risk sources. Farmers who 
had invested off-farm perceived credit risks as much less relevant, perhaps be-
cause their credit obligations are small. Farmers in central areas were more con-
cerned  about  production  risks,  especially  associated  with  the  animal  disease 
variables. The finding may be related to more frequent experiences with disease 
outbreaks in central areas (Norström et al., 2000; Nyberg et al., 2004) and there-
fore greater fear of these risk sources. Also, a higher frequency of livestock 
trade  (Østerås,  personal  communication)  and  more  densely  populated  areas 
may contribute to the greater disease concerns. 
4.6. Perceptions of risk management in relation to farm and farmer characteristics 
The last step was to use multiple linear regressions to relate the information 
on  socio-economic  characteristics  and  risk  perceptions  to  management  re-
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models are presented in Table 6. All models were highly significant and all of 
them explained around 10% of the total variance. 
Organic farmers tended to perceive flexibility and disease prevention as 
more  important  and  consultancy  as  less  important  than  the  conventional 
farmers. Compared to other farmers, the most risk averse farmers perceived 
disease  management  strategies  as  significantly  more  important  and  found 
consultancy less important. The least risk averse farmers were more likely to 
view disease prevention and fixed cost sharing as important management re-
sponses.
Table 6:   Results of multiple regressions for risk management strategiesa, n = 457 
Risk management strategies  Independent variables 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Farming systemb  (*)-0.22 (*)0.22 (*)0.24 -0.07 -0.17 -0.09 -0.06
CRA: ma-mc *-0.18 *0.19 -0.07 0.13 -0.05 0.13 0.04
CRA: la-mc 0.04 *0.26 0.16 (*)0.20 0.10 -0.02 *0.22
Ownershipd -0.15 -0.09 -0.05 -0.12 0.05 -0.21 **0.45
Number of cows  0.00 0.01 0.00 *0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
Farm experience (year)  -0.01 0.00 -0.01 *-0.01 **-0.01 *0.01 0.00
Educatione 0.03 -0.12 0.02 -0.15 (*)0.17 0.15 0.11
Agricultural educationf 0.02 -0.08 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.09 **0.21
Off-farm workg 0.06 0.03 **-0.27 **0.26 (*)0.14 -0.09 0.02
Off-farm investmenth 0.11 -0.08 -0.02 -0.08 ***0.40 -0.04 (*)-0.14
SGM dairy (%)i 0.01 *-0.65 *-0.64 -0.25 0.05 0.30 (*)-0.45
Farm incomej 0.04 0.02 -0.06 0.09 -0.03 0.06 -0.03
Household incomek -0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.10 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03
Geographyl -0.07 0.07 **0.26 *-0.18 -0.06 -0.13 -0.07
1. Productionm ***0.15 ***0.18 ***0.19 (*)0.08 0.06 **0.14 0.01
2. Institutional  0.03 *0.10 (*)0.09 0.01 0.04 ***0.18 0.02
3. Organic farming  -0.03 -0.06 0.02 -0.07 (*)0.09 (*)-0.10 *0.11
4. Credit  ***0.17 (*)0.09 0.07 0.05 0.03 -0.07 *0.11
5. Consumer demand  0.08 *0.10 0.06 0.05 0.01 -0.03 0.02
6. Human resources  0.03 0.04 0.00 (*)0.09 0.03 *0.11 -0.04
R2adj ***0.088 ***0.082 ***0.128 ***0.085 ***0.102 ***0.119 ***0.088
The strategies considered are (1) Consultancy; (2) Diseases; (3) Flexibility; (4) Insurance; (5) Diversification; (6) 
Financial; (7) Fixed cost. 
a Variables and models significant at (*)P0.10, *P0.05, **P0.01 and ***P0.001. 
b Measured as a dummy variable;1 denotes organic farming and 0 denotes conventional farming. 
c Measured as two dummy variables “ma-m” and “la-m”; 0 denotes the medium risk averse attitude (m), and 1 
denotes the most risk averse attitude (ma) and the least risk averse attitude (la), respectively. 
d Measured as a dummy variable where 1 denotes partnerships and 0 denotes otherwise. 
e Measured as a dummy variable where 1 denotes formal schooling beyond high school and 0 denotes high 
school education or less. 
f Measured as a dummy variable where 1 denotes agricultural education and 0 denotes otherwise. 
g Measured as a dummy variable where 1 denotes off-farm work (farmer and/or spouse) and 0 denotes no off-
farm work. 
h Measured as a dummy variable; 1 denotes off-farm investments in the last five years and 0 denotes otherwise. 
i Measured as percent of the farm’s total standard gross margin (SGM) from the dairy enterprise. 
j Measured as a dummy variable where 1 denotes farm income t NOK 200 000 and 0 denotes otherwise. 
k Measured as a dummy variable where 1 denotes household income t NOK 350 000 and 0 denotes otherwise 
l Measured as a dummy variable where 1 denotes central location (no regional policy priority) and 0 denotes oth-
erwise, cf. KRD (2003). 
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All socio-economic variables, except education and the two income vari-
ables,  had  at  least  one  significant  relationship  with  the  risk  management 
strategies. In contrast, earlier studies have found some relationships between 
economic variables (like gross farm income and solvency) and farmers’ per-
ceptions  of  risk  sources  and  management  responses  (Patrick  and  Musser, 
1997; Meuwissen et al., 2001). 
Farmers in partnerships perceived fixed cost sharing as more relevant than 
the others (mostly family farms). Farmers with larger herds were more likely 
to perceive insurance as relevant. More experienced farmers were significantly 
less concerned about insurance and diversification but found financial man-
agement  responses  more  important.  Farmers  with  education  in  agriculture 
placed more emphasis on fixed cost sharing. Off-farm work was associated 
with more importance assigned to insurance responses and less importance 
given to (on-farm) flexibility responses. Not surprisingly, investing off-farm 
was  highly  associated  with  diversification  strategies.  The  most  specialised 
dairy  farmers  perceived  flexibility  and  disease  prevention  as  less  relevant. 
Farmers in central areas found flexibility more important, while insurance was 
of less concern. 
The final independent variables are the perceived risk sources. An essential 
question is: How do farmers cope with the institutional risks? The regressions 
suggested that institutional risks are highly related to financial management 
responses (solvency, liquidity, low cost production). Disease prevention was 
also of importance. The results indicate multidimensionality of institutional 
risks requiring multiple management responses. More creative ways to handle 
risk than the traditional ones referred to in the survey may also be needed 
(Boehlje, 2003). 
Production risks were found to be highly associated with multiple man-
agement responses; consultancy, disease prevention, flexibility and financial 
strategies. No one-to-one correspondence between sources of and responses 
to risk has also been observed previously (Patrick and Musser, 1997). Organic 
farming risks were positively related to fixed cost sharing. Consultancy and 
fixed cost sharing were important responses to credit risks. The risk source 
consumer demand was positively associated with disease prevention, maybe 
related to increased consumer awareness of animal health problems that can 
be reduced through a healthier herd. Farmers who perceived human resource 
risks to be important appreciated financial risk management strategies. 
5. Conclusions 
Our results suggest that organic farmers perceived themselves to be less risk 
averse than their conventional colleagues. Both groups perceived institutional 
risks as primary sources of risk, with farm support payments top rated. Con-
ventional farmers perceived many sources of risk as more important than or-Ola Flaten et al.   446
ganic farmers, the difference being most pronounced for costs of purchased 
inputs and animal welfare policy. Organic farmers gave more weight to institu-
tional factors related to their production systems (organic farming payments, 
price premiums, and organic regulations). 
Financial measures, disease prevention, and insurance were perceived as the 
most important risk management strategies. Organic and conventional farmers’ 
management responses were relative similar but organic farmers rated flexibility 
as more important. Both institutional and production risks were associated with 
multiple ways to handle risk. 
A number of socio-economic variables had significant effects on risk percep-
tions and management responses. More significant variables were found for man-
agement responses than for risk perceptions. The low explanatory power in the 
regression models may imply a high degree of farm-specific risk perceptions. 
The high support payments and high degree of regulation of agriculture in 
Norway obviously impact upon our results. Nevertheless, the agricultural policy 
system is not very different from what is found in several other Northern coun-
tries. This implies that similar results could be found in other countries, as indi-
cated in Finland (Sonkilla, 2002). 
The study revealed notable differences between organic and conventional 
dairy farmers’ risk perceptions, suggesting that government policies may have 
to be applied differently to the two groups. Both groups of farmers were, how-
ever, worried about the institutional risks, indicating the importance of an agri-
cultural policy that is clear, stable and predictable. Policy makers should there-
fore be cautious about changing policy capriciously and they should consider 
the scope for strategic policy initiatives that give farmers some greater confi-
dence about the longer term. One step in a more stable and predictable direc-
tion in Norway would be a change from annual to perennial agricultural nego-
tiations between the farmers’ unions and the government. 
Risk research in agricultural economics and farm management has empha-
sised production and marketing risks (Musser and Patrick, 2002). Our findings 
suggest that more attention should be paid on studying institutional risks. Fur-
ther, farm management consultants and advisers should make more use of deci-
sion analysis tools that incorporate institutional risks. 
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